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THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT: SHOULD THE 102(2)(C) IMPACT 
STATEMENT PROVISION BE APPLICABLE TO A 
FEDERAL AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES HAVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES WITHIN 
ANOTHER SOVEREIGN'S JURISDICTION? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 1 es-
tablished a comprehensive environmental policy for the nation by 
requiring all federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impact 
of their major activities. To accomplish this, the Act prescribes 
certain procedural directives found in section 102(2). 2 Litigation 
involving the NEPA has primarily dealt with these provisions and 
in particular section 102(2)(C). Known as the "teeth"3 of the Act, 
this section requires each agency to prepare and to file a detailed 
statement of the environmental impact a prospective project will 
have before the agency decides to participate or to implement it. 4 
Since its inception, federal agencies dealing in foreign policy 
and foreign assistance programs have steadfastly resisted applica-
tion of NEPA 102(2)(C)5 requirements to their decisionmaking. The 
case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Export-Import Bank 
of the United States6 will test this resistance and determine whether 
a federal agency's activity abroad having significant impact on the 
environment of another country falls within the scope of the NEPA. 
The Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit to enjoin the 
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), a federal agency, from financing 
projects and purchases for foreign countries. Eximbank had not 
prepared impact statements nor had it ever promulgated procedures 
and guidelines to conform its decisionmaking processes to comply 
with the requirements of the Act. 7 
This Note will analyze the scope of the statute's 102(2)(C) pro-
vision to determine its applicability to federal agencies' actions 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). 
2. Id. at § 4332(2). 
3. Strausberg, The National Environmental Policy Act and The Agency for International 
Development, 7 INT'L LAW. 46, 47 (1973). 
4. 42 U.S.C . § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
5. Id. [hereinafter will also be cited by authorities in subsequent quotes in this paper 
as 102(C)J. 
6. No. 77-0080 (D.D.C. , filed Jan. 14, 1977). 
7. Id. 
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abroad. It will be demonstrated that a canon of construction, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, is a suitable and useful aid 
in resolving this issue. With its guidance, an extensive examination 
of statutory language and legislative history will be undertaken to 
establish the intent of Congress, the primary duty of any statutory 
analysis. It will then be observed that there is no clear indication of 
congressional intent and, in its absence, it will be presumed that 
Congress intended the statute's provision to be limited to the terri-
torial boundaries of the nation. After concluding that in actuality 
Congress' concern was primarily domestic, and therefore, its intent 
was only to give 102(2)(E) and not 102(2)(C) an international scope, 
an evaluation of relevant case law will be made to determine 
whether there is any judicial support for the theory that 102(2)(C) 
extends beyond the usual statutory reach. Finding no direct support 
for this hypothesis, and instead, a strong indication that courts will 
consider countervailing policy arguments, practical considerations 
will be noted and scrutinized. In the final analysis, it will be deter-
mined that 102(2)(C) procedure should not apply to federal activi-
ties abroad. 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
A. A Canon of Construction: The Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality. 11 
Some guidance must be supplied before examining the statu-
tory language and the legislative history in order to ascertain con-
gressional intent. This aid comes in the form of a "well-
established"11 canon of construction. In the absence of express lan-
guage indicating a "contrary intent,"'° a statute will be construed 
to apply only to conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States. 11 
This canon of construction has aided courts in numerous cases 
to determine the extraterritorial scope of various congressional en-
actments. For example, in American Banana Co. u. United Fruit 
Co., 12 the Court held that the Sherman Act would not extend to 
foreign restraint of trade activity by an American corporation. Util-
8. Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement 
Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 354 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mich. Note]. 
9. Id. 
10. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S . 281, 285 (1949). 
11. Id.; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S . 421, 437 (1932) . 
12. 210 U.S. 347 (1909). 
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izing a strict territorial approach, Justice Holmes stated that "in 
[a] case of doubt" statutes must be interpreted as embracing only 
acts committed within the "territorial limits over which the law-
maker has general and legitimate power." 1:1 He concluded that the 
acts performed in Panama and Costa Rica did not fall within the 
ambit of the U.S. statute. 14 The Justice seemed to be concerned that 
the comity of nations might be harmed by a holding to the contrary. 
Although the strict territorial approach of American Banana 
was subsequently modified in United States v. Bowman, 15 the Su-
preme Court, in Blackmer v. United States, 16 determined that Con-
gress had the authority to extend its laws to govern the actions of 
its citizens in other countries. The Court focused on the question of 
statutory construction. Did Congress intend the law to be applicable 
to its citizens abroad? 17 The Court utilized the canon of construction 
to aid in its determination 111 that Congress had clearly indicated the 
Act's scope would reach citizens residing abroad by expressly pro-
viding for the U.S. consul to serve process on these citizens. 
In Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 19 the Court refused to extend the 
Eight Hour Law20 to public works projects built in Iran on behalf of 
13. Id. at 357 (footnotes, omitted). The Court said: 
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiffs case depends on several rather 
startling propositions. In the first place the acts causing the damage were done, so 
far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other 
states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Con-
gress. 
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any 
statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits 
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. "All legislation is prima 
facie territorial." 
Id. at 355, 357. 
14. Id. at 357. "We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or 
Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned." Id. 
15. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
16. 284 U.S. 421 (1932) . 
17. Id. at 437. "[T]here is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of 
the municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own govern-
ment." Id. (footnote omitted). 
Id. 
18. Id. 
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed 
to apply only within the territorial United States, the question of its application, so 
far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one of 
construction, not of legislative power. 
19. 336 U.S. 281 (1949) . 
20. Act of Aug. 1, 1892, ch . 352, 27 Stat. 340 (repealed by Act of Aug. 13, 1962, Pub. L. 
87-581, title II, § 203, 76 Stat. 360). 
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the United States. The question again was not of power but of 
statutory construction. 21 The Court reaffirmed the "canon of con-
struction"22 utilized in Blackmer and noted that "[i]t is based on 
the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic 
conditions. "2a Thus the Court found "nothing in the Act itself, as 
amended, nor in the legislative history, which would lead to the 
belief that Congress entertained any intention other than the nor-
mal one in this case."24 
It would appear that Congress has taken into account the Foley 
decision by providing the requisite express language in subsequent 
federal statutes. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law25 notes 
several statutes which have been appropriately phrased so as to 
apply to conduct occurring outside the United States. 26 
The courts have, in certain circumstances, found an extraterri-
torial scope where the statute's language has not clearly indicated 
such a reach. The courts still employ the Foley canon of construc-
tion, but in such cases imply that its strict use is unnecessary since 
congressional intent is obvious. In United States v. Bowman, 27 the 
criminal legislation involved did not specifically include in its scope 
offenses committed on the high seas or in foreign countries. Noting 
"it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do 
so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard, "2R the Court 
21. "The question before us is not the power of Congress to extend the Eight Hour Law 
to work performed in foreign countries. Petitioners concede that such power exists . . . . The 
question is rather whether Congress intended to make the law applicable to such work." 336 
U.S. at 284-85. 
22. Id. at 285. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. The Court continued by saying: "There is no language in the Eight Hour Law, 
here in question, that gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage 
beyond places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative 
control." Id. 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965). 
26. Federal statutes designed to be applied to conduct taking place outside the 
United States usually expressly so provide, e.g.: 
(i) 18 U.S.C. §§ 7,9 (1958) dealing with offenses within the "special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," including national vessels and 
national aircraft. 
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1958) makes treason "within the United States or elsewhere" 
an offense. The statute has in several cases been applied to acts of treason committed 
outside the United States. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) . . . 
Id. at § 38. 
27. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
28. Id. at 98. 
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did apply "the same rule of interpretation"211 to criminal statutes 
which were intended to protect the Government and its property. 
Here, it can be logically inferred that Congress wishes to protect its 
property and itself since the statute is entitled "Offenses against the 
Operation of the Government.":111 
The Lanham Act31 was interpreted in Steele v. Bulova Watch 
Co. 32 as having language conferring "broad jurisdictional powers 
upon the courts of the United States."33 Although there is, arguably, 
language of an express nature, 34 the Court primarily based its deci-
sion on the activities by the petitioner within the United States and 
the domestic effect his activities had. The Court observed that com-
ponent parts of the petitioner's "Bulovas" entered the United States 
and concluded that this competition would have, in the United 
States and elsewhere, an adverse effect on Bulova Watch Com-
pany's carefully "cultivated" trade name.35 
This opinion did not go unchallenged. In a strong dissent, 36 
Justice Reed chastised the Court for its improper interpretation. In 
his opinion, the only acts of infringement were to be found in Mex-
ico.37 Thus, the question was one of statutory interpretation. 311 Utiliz-
ing the traditional canon of construction, the Justice determined 
that there was no contrary congressional intent or explicit words 
which could evidence an extraterritorial scope.311 
It should be noted that subsequently, in Vanity Fair Mills v. 
T. Eaton Co., 40 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply 
the Lanham Act to a trademark infringement by an alien in Can-
ada, even though it might have had an adverse economic effect on 
Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 98-99. 
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). 
32. 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
33. Id. at 283. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 286. 
His operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a 
foreign nation. He bought component parts of his wares in the United States and 
spurious "Bulovas" filtered through the Mexican border into this country; his com-
peting goods could well reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Company's trade reputa-
tion in markets cultivated by advertising here as well as abroad. 
36. Id. at 289. 
37. Id. at 290. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956). 
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American commerce. The court suggested that the Act would not 
apply to a foreign citizen's acts within his own country in accord-
ance with a valid trademark registration. 41 
In Laurizton v. Larsen, 42 the Court interpreted the Jones Act43 
as not applying to a Danish seaman negligently injured aboard a 
foreign ship while in Havana harbor. The Court considered and 
rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the Jones Act would be appli-
cable here in lieu of Danish law. "This contention that the Jones 
Act provides an optional cumulative remedy is not based on any 
explicit terms of the Act, which makes no provision for cases in 
which remedies have been obtained or are obtainable under foreign 
law."44 The Justices perceived that the words employed in the stat-
41. 234 F.2d at 642. The court stated: 
fWle do not think that Congress intended that the infringement remedies provided 
in § 32(1 )(a) and elsewhere should be applied to acts committed by a foreign national 
in his home country under a presumably valid trademark registration in that country. 
The Lanham Act itself gives almost no indication of the extent to which Congress 
intended to exercise its power in this area . . . . 
In the Bulova case, ... the Court stressed three factors: ( 1) the defendant's 
conduct had a substantial effect on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was 
a United States citizen and the United States has a broad power to regulate the 
conduct of its citizens in foreign countries; and (3) there was no conflict with trade-
mark rights established under the foreign law, since the defendant's Mexican regis-
tration had been canceled by proceedings in Mexico. Only the first factor is present 
in this case. 
We do not think that the Bulova case lends support to plaintiff; to the contrary, 
we think that the rationale of the Court was so thoroughly based on the power of the 
United States to govern "the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even 
in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not in-
fringed", that the absence of one of the above factors might well be determinative 
and that the absence of both is certainly fatal. 
Id. at 642-43 (footnotes omitted). 
The court does not state that if two of the factors are present (the defendant is a U.S. 
citizen and there is no infringement on foreign law) this occurrence will be enough to waive a 
showing of the third factor (substantial effect) and thus permit extraterritorial application 
of the statute in question. In, Mich. Note, supra note 8, it was similarly argued that this canon 
of construction rested on two considerations-that Congress was concerned with domestic 
conditions and that Congress did not wish to infringe on the laws of other nations . It was 
submitted that if there was no infringement on the laws of other countries then the presence 
of the second factor (that Congress had not been primarily concerned with domestic condi-
tions when enacting this legislation) would not be required and the clear expression necessary 
under the canon need not be ascertained. This reasoning as the above quote shows is without 
support. Nor does Foley show that there are two considerations on which this canon of 
construction rests . It is more likely that the canon rests on domestic concern. Instead, the 
court will take into account the presence of all three factors, especially domestic effect, (as 
will be proven later) before deciding not to apply the canon strictly. 
42. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). 
43. 46 U.S .C. § 688 (1970). 
44. 345 U.S. at 576 (1953). 
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ute were of a broad and sweeping character. 45 The Court noted that 
provisions of the shipping laws had traditionally been construed 
narrowly and thus have had limited application. 46 The Court con-
cluded that "Congress could not have been unaware of the necessity 
of construction imposed upon courts by such generality of language 
and was well warned that in absence of more definite directions 
• • • • "
47 The opinion bolstered its conclusion with another basic 
concept stemming from "the long-heeded admonition of Mr. Chief 
Justice Marshall that 'an act of congress [sic] ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible con-
struction remains . . . . ' " 48 
This language of the Court does not evidence another principle 
upon which the canon of construction rests. 49 Instead this admoni-
45. Id. The Court observed: 
Rather he relies upon the literal catholicity of its terminology. If read literally, Con-
gress has conferred an American right of action which requires nothing more than 
that plaintiff be "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his 
employment." It makes no explicit requirement that either the seaman, the employ-
ment or the injury have the slightest connection with the United States. Unless some 
relationship of one or more of these to our national interest is implied, Congress has 
extended our law and opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere 
in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign nation-a hand on a Chinese 
junk, never outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal wording. 
Id. at 576-77. 
46. Id. at 577. The Court determined: 
The shipping laws of the United States, set forth in Title 46 of the United States 
Code, comprise a patchwork of separate enactments, some tracing far back in our 
history and many designed for particular emergencies. While some have been specific 
in application to foreign shipping and others in being confined to American shipping, 
many give no evidence that Congress addressed itself to their foreign application and 
are in general terms which leave their application to be judicially determined from 
context and circumstances. By usage as old as the Nation, such statutes have been 
construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be 
considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law. Thus, in United 
States u. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, this Court was called upon to interpret a statute of 
1790 (1 Stat. 115) punishing certain acts when committed on the high seas by "any 
person or persons," terms which, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observed, are "broad 
enough to comprehend every human being." But the Court determined that the 
literal universality of the prohibition "must not only be limited to cases within the 
jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended 
to apply them" (p. 631) and therefore would not reach a person performing the 
proscribed acts aboard the ship of a foreign state on the high seas. 
Id. at 577-78 (quoting Marshall, C.J., in The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804)). 
47. Id. at 581. 
48. Id. at 578 (quoting Marshall, C.J., in The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 
117-18 (1804)). 
49. Id. 
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tion of Marshall amounts to a prudential consideration which is in 
"accord"50 with "this doctrine of construction."51 The Court clearly 
points out that there is no question of infringement on principles of 
international law: 
On the contrary, we are simply dealing with a problem of statutory 
construction rather commonplace in a federal system by which 
courts often have to decide whether "any" or "every" reaches to the 
limits of the enacting authority's usual scope or is to be applied to 
foreign events or transactions.52 
The Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell53 
case once again demonstrates the substantial conduct theory. Al-
though this case . involves the regulation of a foreign corporation 
rather than an American "citizen, " 54 the court asserted jurisdiction 
even in the face of an inconclusive Securities Exchange Act, 55 be-
cause there had been "significant" conduct in the United States. 511 
There was domestic impact as well, since the acts committed in the 
United States were part of a scheme to defraud an American inves-
tor. 57 
A review of the cases reveals that the courts will employ the 
presumption against extraterritoriality unless there is a showing 
that there is substantial conduct within the United States or that 
foreign activity is demonstrated as having a substantial domestic 
impact or effect. In addition, the courts have applied statutes if 
there is a criminal offense perpetrated against the U.S. Government 
in the absence of clear language in the statute to the contrary. 
In the case presently before the court, 58 there is no criminal 
offense against the Government involved, nor has there been a 
showing of any substantial conduct within the territorial bound-
aries of the United States. Unless there is demonstrated by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council that there is substantial con-
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 578-79. The Court footnoted this with a good discussion of the subject. Id. at 
579n.7. 
53. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). 
54. Id. at 1333. 
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976). 
56. 468 F.2d at 1334. The significant conduct was "when substantial misrepresentations 
were made in the United States." Id. at 1337. 
57. Id. 
58. National Resources Defense Council v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 
No.77-0080 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 14, 1977). 
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duct or substantial impact within the United States, the courts 
should utilize the clear language test511 which has invaluably aided 
the courts in the past. 
B. Statutory Language 
To satisfy the canon of construction reviewed earlier, 80 a statute 
or a section of the statute81 involved must contain express language 
or a clear indication that Congress intended it to have an extraterri-
torial scope. On its face this section does not have such an expres-
sion. Although "all agencies"62 is certainly a clear indication that 
Congress intended the statute to apply to every federal agency, the 
subsequent language does not indicate whether the Act applies to 
major federal actions within or without the territorial United States. 
The phrase "human environment"83 is equally uninformative as 
one commentator has noted: 
[I]t cannQt be inferred that simply because Congress used "hu-
man environment," rather than "national environment," it in-
tended section 102(2)(C) to apply to the worldwide environment. It 
seems clear that Congress utilized the former phrase to ensure that 
the environmental consequences would be viewed from the human 
perspective rather than solely from an objective physical perspec-
tive.84 
This observation can be garnered from the remarks of Senator Jack-
59. The canon of construction or presumption against extraterritoriality mentioned be-
fore. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
60. Id. 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). Section 102 provides: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . (2) 
all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
sh<;mld the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term prod-
uctivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented. 
64. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 360. 
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son accompanying the Senate Committee Report and Dr. Lynton 
Caldwell's statement in the Senate Hearings. 115 
Throughout the statute there are words and phrases of ambigu-
ous meaning utilized, such as "man's," "environment," "bio-
sphere," "all agencies," etc. Reliance on such words as indicating 
an extraterritorial scope would be ill placed. A rule of statutory 
construction laid down in American Banana, 88 cited in Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co. 87 and utilized in Sociedad Nacional De Manneros 
de Honduras v. McCulloch, 811 establishes that "[w]ords having uni-
versal scope, such as '[e]very contract in restraint of trade,' 
'[e]very person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken ... to 
mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the 
legislator subsequently may be able to catch. " 811 
Thus, it becomes clear that these words must be taken as de-
scribing subject matter within the territorial United States. Fur-
ther, it should be noted that words such as biosphere are words of 
art and, in this case, biosphere's definition and use indicates no 
geographical or territorial "quantity." 
If words of general m~aning are to be weighed, then the specific 
words as "Americans" and "Nation" found scattered throughout 
the NEPA must be balanced as well. For, if examined closely, these 
words in their context seem to give the Act a decided domestic 
character. 
At the outset, the Act heralds, by its title, the probable domes-
tic interest embodied in the statute. A title can and will be consid-
ered in interpreting a statute.70 Here, National Environmental Pol-
icy Act seems to indicate a concern with the environmental policy 
relating to one nation, the United States. 71 
The preamble, which enumerates the purposes of the Act, sug-
gests a predominant domestic purpose by the following phrase: "to 
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural re-
65. 115 CONG. R.Ec. 40416 (1969); Hearings on S . 1075, S. 237 and S. 1151 Before the 
Senate Comm . on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as Senate Hearings]. 
66. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
67. 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
68. 201 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C.), af{'d, 372 U.S. 10 (1962). 
69. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
70. 2A D. SANDS, STATtrrES AND STATtrrORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.03 (4th ed. 1973). 
71. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1505 (1971). National is defined as, 
"of, relating to, or affecting one nation as distinguished from several nations or a suprana-
tional group . . . compare INTERNATIONAL . . . . " Id. 
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sources important to the nation .... " 72 Similarly, section lOl(a),1:1 
which enumerates the environmental policy of Congress, states a 
goal with this phrase: "and fulfill the social, economic and other 
requirements of present and future generations of Americans. "74 In 
addition, section 101(b)75 which delineates another list of goals, ad-
vances the theory that Congress was primarily concerned with do-
mestic goals by the phrase "to improve and coordinate Federal 
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Na ti on 
may- . . . (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, 
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings. " 711 A close 
examination of these sections and the enacting clause easily pro-
vides the reader with a foundation for concluding that the statute 
is domestic in concern.77 
A final argument to support this proposition is to be found in 
section 201.7x This subchapter calls for a report to be submitted to 
Congress by the Council on Environmental Quality, 
which shall set forth (1) the status and condition of the ... environ-
mental classes of the Nation ... (2) current and foreseeable trends 
. . . and the effects of those trends on the social, economic, and 
other requirements of the Nation; (3) the adequacy of available 
natural resources for fulfilling human and economic requirements of 
the Nation. 711 
It is apparent from this that Congress was concerned with the 
domestic problems and conditions that the Nation's environment 
would produce and required a report only on the Nation's environ-
ment. It would be logical to conclude that if Congress was so con-
cerned with the global environment, as evidenced by the scattered , 
references to the world's environment, it would have so indicated its 
concern by requiring a review of the effect of federal agencies' pro-
grams and activities throughout the world. 
72. 42 u.s.c. § 4321 (1970). 
73. Id. § 4331(a) (1970). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. This conclusion can arguably be supported by the theories of noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis. "The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words." 
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (1968). "The doctrine means that general and specific words 
are associated with and take color from each other, restricting general words to sense analo-
gous to less general. Dunham v. State, 140 Fla. 754, 192 So. 324, 325, 326 (1939)." Id. "Of 
the same kind, class, or nature." Id. at 608. 
78. 42 u.s.c. § 4341 (1970). 
79. Id. 
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C. Legislative History 
Legislative history is an additional tool used to interpret a stat-
ute. The history involved indicates first, an absence of a clear indi-
cation from Congress that 102(2)(C) action-forcing procedures have 
an extraterritorial scope, and second, a strong suggestion, as the 
Court has recognized, 80 that Congress was primarily concerned with 
domestic issues. It appears that what little international concern 
Congress had was codified in section 102(2) (E). Furthermore, the 
history does not show any linkage between 102(2)(E) and 102(2)(C), 
thus it is unlikely that these two provisions should be read together. 
The House bill, H.R. 12549, was designed by the drafters81 
merely to amend the Fisheries and Wildlife Act82 in order to set up 
a Council on Environmental Quality. Hearings on the bill were held 
by the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.83 Of the nu-
merous statements before the committee there is but a single refer-
ence, in a statement by Margaret Mead, 114 to the international scope 
that the bill should have. These few sentences must be balanced 
against the tremendous amount of testimony and material before 
the Committee, which might be classified as domestic in concern. 
It must be weighed in light of its effect on the committee. The re-
mark engendered no debate. 85 Nor did it spur Congressmen to 
amend H.R. 12549 to include a section 102(2)(C) type impact provi-
sion having an express international scope, or a section 102(2)(E) 
type international cooperative provision. 86 In fact, the House bill 
never contained either of these directives. 87 
Instead, the Hearings culminated in a House Report88 which 
clearly does not express an extraterritori.al scope and rather point-
edly states: 
The purpose of the bill, as hereby reported, is to create a Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality with a broad and independent over-
80. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
81. Mr. Dingall, et al. 
82. 16 u.s.c. §§ 741-754 (1976). 
83. Hearings on H.R. 6750, H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R. 12180, H.R. 12207, 
H.R. 12209, H.R. 12228, H.R. 12264, and H.R. 12409, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
84. Id. at 26. 
85. Id. 
86. 115 CONG. REC. 26571-90 (1969). 
87. Id. 
88. H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as H. REP.]. 
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view of current and long-term trends in the quality of our national 
environment to advise the President, and through him the Congress 
and the American people on steps which may and should be taken 
to improve the quality of that environment.'11' 
The Hearings110 and the Report•1 surrounding the Senate bill, S. 
1075, must be examined and "accorded the greatest weight" in in-
terpreting 102(2)(C), "since all the 102(2) directives found in NEPA 
are taken from S. 1075."112 The Senate Hearings show "little atten-
tion"•3 paid to the "limited territorial scope of S. 1075."94 This lack 
of commentary on extraterritoriality does not provide the requisite 
clear indication necessary to give the NEPA 102(2)(C) directive an 
extraterritorial scope. 
The Senate Conference Report is not "comparably clear"95 ei-
ther. There is nothing in the Report which indicates that the 
102(2)(C) provision requires federal agencies abroad to file impact 
statements for foreign activities. There is no indication of an extra-
territorial scope for 102(2)(C) at all. Finally, there is no indication 
that 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(E) supplement each other and should be 
construed in conjunction with each other. Nor does the section by 
section analysis1111 give the slightest hint of an extraterritorial scope 
for 102(2)(C). Instead, the Senate Report suggests that the drafts-
men were concerned with the quality of the Nation's environment: 
Id. 
It is the unanimous view of the members of the Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee that our Nations present state of knowl-
edge, our established public policies, and our existing governmental 
institutions are not adequate to deal with the growing environmen-
tal problems and crises the Nation faces. 97 
89. Id. at 1. The House Report further stated: 
In achieving the purpose, the bill would require the transmission to the Congress 
by the President of an annual environmental quality report on the status of various 
aspects of the American environment, as well as on the foreseeable trends that may 
affect that status, and on their impact on other national requirements. 
90. Senate Hearings, supra note 65. 
91. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. 
92. Mich. ·Note, supra note 8, at 366. 
93. Id. at 367. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 366. 
96. S. REP., supra note 91, at 20. 
97. Id. at 4. The Senate Report continued: 
The inadequacy of present knowledge, policies, and institutions is reflected in 
our Nation's history, in our national attitudes, and in our contemporary life. 
13
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On the other hand, there are words and phrases of broad mean-
ing utilized throughout the legislative history. Words such as 
"man's," "biosphere," "all," "environment," and "human environ-
ment" can be found in the Hearings, congressional records and doc-
uments and in the Senate and House Reports. However, application 
of the American Banana theory of statutory construction would re-
quire that these words be construed to refer to subject matter within 
the territorial limits of the United States. 
Moreover, Cong-ress must be aware that language of such gen-
eral character will be construed narrowly by the courts.98 Therefore, 
Congress' failure to give a clear indication of an extraterritorial 
scope for 102(2)(C)-or some sign of a link between 102(2)(C) and 
102(2)(E) in the legislative history-can only mean that Congress 
did not intend the provision to have such a scope. 
There are statements to be found in the Senate Hearings which 
show a concern with the international aspects of environmental 
problems. Statements such as William Macomber's recommenda-
tion that the bill take into account that: 
1. The deterioration of the national environment is part of a global 
process and thus requires remedial action on an international as well 
as a national scale. 
2. Study, review and research must, therefore, be extended to take 
into account problems . . . beyond national borders . . . . 
3. The solution of the environmental problem being a matter of 
national interest as well as of international concern, U.S. participa-
tion in bilateral and multilateral programs dealing with the interna-
tional aspects of the problem must be recognized as a vital part of 
U.S. policy to cope with environmental problems.99 
This language should be com pared to the remarks found in the 
section by section analysis on section 102(2)(E) in both the Senate 
Report and the final Conference Report. The similarity is striking. 
Id. 
In recognition of the fact that environmental problems are not 
confined by political boundaries, all agencies of the Federal Govern-
If the United States is to create and maintain a balanced and healthful environ-
ment, new means and procedures to preserve environmental values in the larger 
public interest, to coordinate Government activities that shape our future environ-
ment, and to provide guidance and incentives for State and local government and 
for private enterprise must be devised. 
98. See notes 25, 26, 28, 47 supra and accompanying text. 
99. Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 10. 
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ment which have international responsibilities are authorized and 
directed to lend support to appropriate international efforts to an-
ticipate and prevent a decline in the quality of the worldwide envi-
ronment. In doing so however, the agencies are constrained to act 
in a manner consistent with the foreign policy of the United 
States. 100 
It seems apparent from this comparison, that the addition of 
section 102(2)(E), after the Senate Hearings, was intended to encap-
sulate this and similar statements, ideas, and solutions into 
102(2)(E) and make it "the sole protection for the international 
environment." 101 Senator Jackson's remarks accompanying the · 
reading of the Conference Report into the record would seem to 
prove that this observation is correct. 102 
Thus, it is logical to conclude that 102(2)(E) is the only direc-
tive Congress 103 intended to have an international scope and that all 
other procedural directives, including 102(2)(C), are concerned with 
domestic activities. 
There is a strong indication that Congress, in particular, the 
Senate, was primarily concerned with domestic issues in enacting 
the NEPA. The fact that the Senate Hearings were held before the 
Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, a committee tradi-
tionally concerned with domestic problems, is significant. It should 
be noted that the record does not indicate that the Committee ever 
officially consulted with the Foreign Relations Committee or any 
Id. 
100. 115 CONG. REC. 40420 (1969) . 
101. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 367. 
102. 115 CONG. REC. 40416-17 (1969). He said: 
Another provision that should be brought to the attention of the Senate is section 
102(e) of the conference report. 
This provision was added to the bill as an amendment I offered in the Senate 
Interior Committee in June. The purpose of the provision is to give statutory author-
ity to all Federal agencies to participate in the development of a positive, forward 
looking program of international cooperation in dealing with environmental problems 
all nations and all people share . . . . 
103. The House is included, here, as well. The House report displayed similar language: 
"It is an unfortunate fact that many and perhaps most forms of environmental pollution cross 
international boundaries as easily as they cross states lines." H. REP., supra note 88, at 7. 
The Committee seems to have been concerned with domestic activities which could have 
environmental impacts on other countries. For example, pollution from our smokestacks 
could easily cross into Canada or Mexico. Thus, the Committee was expressing concern as it 
should that one nation's domestic activities should not despoil another nation's environment. 
There is no indication that there was concern about our foreign activities environmental 
impact, which have been encouraged by another nation. 
15
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other committee. It has been argued that Senator Jackson, the bill's 
sponsor, intentionally limited the scope of S. 1075 so that his com-
mittee would have jurisdiction.104 
In fact, it seems clear from the statements made by the Sena-
tors and Congressmen at the Hearings and in debate before adop-
tion of the bills that most of the NEPA, including the action-forcing 
procedures, reflects a domestic concern and scope. 105 
Finally, it should be noted that in S. 1075 section 102(2)(E) was 
characterized as "international effects." 108 Several statements 
throughout the legislative history lead one to believe that Congress 
was concerned with the problem of domestic activities, 107 having an 
environmental impact on other countries outside the United States. 
For example, the use of pesticides in the United States has environ-
mental impact on other countries as well, since the pesticides can 
eventually get into our rivers and flow into Canada or Mexico. 108 
This is a problem that concerns every nation. 109 There is no indica-
tion, though, that Congress was concerned about our limited in-
volvement in joint foreign activities having environmental impact 
where these activities are encouraged or invited by the nation's 
sovereign. 
104. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRTS (1973). 
105. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969). Senator Jackson characterized NEPA as a "national 
policy for the management of America's future environment." Id. 
Senator Allot, co-sponsor of S. 1075 summed up what the NEPA stood for by the follow-
ing statement. "It has been accurately stated that by the enactment of this measure, the 
Congress is not giving the American people something, rather the Congress is responding to 
the demands of the American people." Id. at 40422. 
Senator Muskie added: "Mr. President, S. 1075 brings into focus the Senate's continuing 
concern for the quality of the Nation's environment." Id. at 29053. 
Senator Nelson manifested his concern for the nation's environment. "In much of the 
Nation, we destroyed our forests. Then across the nation, we destroyed our rivers." Senate 
Hearings, supra note 65, at 59. 
Finally Senator Randolph stated: 
[tlhis legislation which is of concern, ... to Congress and the people of the United 
States. Today, approximately 203 million persons live in an area that is becoming 
increasingly confined. Because of the problems of urban development, mobility of 
people, and the methods by which products are moved from one point to another our 
society and our environment are constantly changing. 
115 CoNG. REc. 40425 (1969). 
106. 115 CONG. REC. 29056 (1969). 
107. Note that activities, here, should have a direct environmental impact. In other 
words, there is direct causation. The act of building and running a railroad would have a 
direct environmental impact, however a contract to finance same would not. 
108. It should be noted that these activities have a direct environmental impact. See 
note 103 supra. 
109. See note 103 supra. 
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III. CASE LAW 
To date there has been no case decided which has directly dealt 
with the issue of the applicability of the National Environmental 
Policy Act to foreign assistance programs. However, five cases have 
raised the issue of extraterritorial application of the NEPA. 
The case of most importance is Sierra Club v. AEC, uo which 
directly questioned the applicability of the NEPA to foreign assis-
tance programs. The suit centered around a nuclear generating sys-
tem export program. The sale of these . systems and fuels to other 
countries involved the financial aid of the Export-Import Bank. The 
sales also involved technical help and cooperation of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and the State Department. All three were 
named as defendants in the suit filed by the Sierra Club, which 
claimed that each named defendant should file a 102(2)(C) impact 
statement. 111 The issue was never decided since the AEC voluntarily 
agreed to prepare an impact statement. The issue being moot, the 
court held it "inappropriate where, as here, the court finds it unnec-
essary to impose specifically any positive NEPA obligation on Ex-
imbank."112 Although it might be argued that the court in effect 
acknowledged some agency would have to file an impact statement 
for a foreign assistance program, it is possible to distinguish this 
case on its facts, its holding, 113 and the underlying interest involved. 
The potential for great harm, including domestic imP,act, is much 
greater than that which would be found in most foreign assistance 
programs. 
The court in People of Enewetak v. Laird 114 decided whether the 
NEPA applied to the Defense Department's activities in a trust 
territory. The Defense Department had filed an original impact 
statement concerning the project on Enewetak which was to test our 
nuclear defenses by simulating nuclear blasts with high explo-
sives.115 The Council on Environmental Quality requested a more 
complete r.eport be filed. The Defense Department agreed to file 
one. Thus, there was no question as to the filing of the impact 
statement. The issue which remained was whether the court had 
110. Civil No. 1867-73 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) . 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Because this case was settled out of court, no decision on the merits of extraterrito-
rialy applying the NEPA was reached. 
114. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973) . 
115. Id. at 814. 
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subject matter jurisdiction under the NEPA to enjoin continued 
core drilling while the new impact statement was being prepared. 116 
The court held that the NEPA would apply since the residents of 
the Trust Territory are subject to U.S. authority and "do not have 
an independent government which can move to protect them from 
United States' actions that are thought to be harmful to their 
environment. " 117 
In the People of Saipan v. Dept. of Interior, m the same court 
held that the NEPA could be applied to federal agencies operating 
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 119 Suit was filed in order 
to enjoin implementation of a lease agreement for construction and 
operation of a hotel on public land in Saipan. The Trust Territory 
Government, in particular the High Commissioner, had not pre-
pared an environmental impact statement which would consider the 
hotel's influence on the environment. The court concluded that "the 
Trust Territory Government was not a federal agency" 120 subject to 
judicial review under the APA or NEPA, and thus dismissed the 
suit. 
It is worthy to note that the Enewetak court did confront the 
Foley canon of construction. The court did not reject the canon but 
found instead, that there was an indication that Congress intended 
the statute to extend to trust territories by its use of "the Nation" 121 
language instead of the "United States. " 122 The court stated: 
Congress must manifest an intention to include the Trust Territory 
within the coverage of a given statute before the courts will apply 
its provisions to claims arising there. Such an intention is usually 
indicated by defining the term "State" or "United States" as used 
in the legislation to include the Trust Territory. Hence a problem 
of statutory construction arises . . . . 
By its own terms, NEPA is not restricted to the United States 
territory delimited by the fifty states. In contrast to the usual prac-
tice, the term "United States" is left undefined and used only twice 
in the entire statute, and in both of these instances it serves the 
limited purpose of identifying certain policies, regulations and pub-
116. Id. at 820. 
117. Id. at 818. 
118. 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii 1973), aff'd as modified, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974) , 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). 
119. 356 F. Supp. at 647. 
120. Tarlock, The Application of the NEPA to the Darien Gap Highway Project, 7 
N.Y.U.J. lNT'L L. & POL. 459, 465 (1974) . 
121. 353 F. Supp. at 816. 
122. Id. at 815. 
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lie laws that would otherewise remain ambiguous. Where one would 
have expected "United States" to have been used, the lawmakers 
substituted the much broader term "Nation."123 
335 
The court's opinion in Enewetak, and subsequently in People 
of Saipan, can be also attributed to a United States governmental 
interest. Congress had legislative control over the island. Moreover, 
in each case there was no sovereign power to protect the people 
involved. Instead, the United States, as trustee, was burdened with 
this responsibility. 
The fourth case, Sierra Club v. Colemen, 12' involved a deficient 
impact statement already prepared and circulated by the Federal 
Highway Administration. The defendants, the Department of 
Transportation and the Federal Highways Administration, were 
engaged in constructing the "Darien Gap Highway" 125 through Pan-
ama and Columbia which would link up the Pan American Highway 
System of South America with the Inter-American Highway. 128 
Sierra Club brought suit to enjoin further construction until an 
impact statement was prepared that would meet the substantive 
and procedural requirements of NEPA. 127 The court granted the 
injunction noting that the defendant never objected to filing an 
environmental impact statement. Instead, the defendants argued 
that their original document complied with the impact statement 
requirements of NEPA. 128 In answer to this argument, the court 
outlined several major problems found in the document: 
The second major defect in the "Assessment" is a substantive 
one: the failure of that document to adequately discuss the prob-
lems of the transmission of aftosa, or "foot-and-mouth" disease. 
While there is in the document a recognition of the probable trans-
Tnission of aftosa absent the most stringent of control programs, .and 
a consequent discussion of the evolving plans for preventing trans-
mission of the disease to North America, there is no discussion 
whatsoever of the environmental impact upon the United States of 
a breakdown of such a control program. Considering that, according 
to the undisputed record in this case, aftosa is the most serious 
existing livestock disease, which if it spread into the United States 
could result in the destruction of up to twenty-five percent of North 
123. Id. at 815-16 (footnotes omitted). 
124. 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975). 
125. Id. at 54. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 56. 
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American livestock and an economic loss of ten biilion dollars, as 
well as the extinction of such endangered species as the American 
bison, it seems evident that an impact statement which fails to 
discuss this possibility is fatally de(icient. 129 
Thus, the case is of little support to the proposition of the 
extraterritorial reach of the 102(2)(C) provision since an impact 
statement had already been prepared and no argument was made 
against its preparation. At best, the case simply signifies the court's 
willingness to r~quire NEPA disclosure where there is likelihood of 
substantial impact on United States territory. 
The final case, Wilderness Society v. Morton, 130 is of question-
able relevance to the issue of the reach of the NEPA. The court 
recognized the right of a Canadian environmental group to enter 
into a suit filed against the Secretary of the Interior to test whether 
he had complied with procedures under the NEPA before he decided 
to issue permits for the Trans-Alaska pipeline. However, "[u]nder 
general principles of international law, the United States has a duty 
to manage activities within its territorial boundaries so as not to 
cause damage to environment of adjoining countries." 131 Moreover, 
this case was not deciding U.S. Government agency activities within 
the jurisdiction of another sovereign. Thus, finding no direct sup-
port in case law, it might be of some assistance to review cases in 
which the courts have not applied NEPA 102(2)(C) due to counter-
vailing considerations. 
In Cohen v. Price Commission, 132 the court refused to apply 
section 102(2)(C) "to an authorization by the Price Commission 
under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 for a fare increase on 
New York City subways and buses." 133 The court did not grant the 
requested temporary relief. Instead the court seemed to feel that the 
plaintiffs would fail on the merits "because the Price Commission's 
duty to act with dispatch was inconsistent with the systematic and 
interdisciplinary study required by NEPA. " 134 
The District Court for the District of Columbia reasoned simi-
larly when it dismissed a suit brought by the Gulf Oil Corporation 135 
129. Id. at 55. 
130. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir . 1972). 
131. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 465. 
132. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S .D.N.Y. 1972) . 
133. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 467. 
134. Id. 
135. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (0.D.C . 1974), a{{'d, 502 F.2d 1154 
(Temp: Erner. Ct. App. 1974). 
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which contended that the Energy Office's establishment of crude oil 
quota constituted a major federal action and thus required the filing 
of an impact statement. 
Mr. Tarlock has persuasively argued in his article, The Appli-
cation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the 
Darien Gap Highway Project136 that: "Cohen and Gulf Oil do stand 
for the proposition that the agency can exempt itself by demonstrat-
ing that the blanket application of NEPA would seriously interfere 
with its ability to carry out its primary mission." 137 
His observation seems to be well grounded since the court in 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Federal Maritime Commission138 
refused to grant a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction 
on a suit challenging the so-called "Far East minibridge tariffs" 139 
on the theory that the defendants violated the National Environ-
mental Policy Act in their handling of the tariffs. The court rea-
soned that the Federal Maritime Commission had an obligation to 
accept tariffs under the Shipping Act. If compliance with the NEPA 
requirement would interfere with the agency's duty, the court con-
cluded that the NEPA "might have to yield." 140 
IV. POLICY AND OTHER COUNTERVAILING 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Courts have considered, and always will consider, other factors, 
policies, and arguments before deciding to apply the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act. Even if a court should find that there was a 
theoretical base, through statutory language or legislative history, 
Id. 
136. Tarlock, supra note 120. 
137. Id. at 467-68. 
138. 392 F. Supp. 795 (D.D.C. 1975). 
139. Id. at 798. 
140. Id. at 802. 
Further, even if there is an inconsistency between NEPA's requirements and the 
Shipping Act, plaintiffs have failed to show that the former would control. By its own 
terms, NEPA applies only "to the fullest extent possible." Agencies are exempted 
from compliance with NEPA when compliance would give rise to agency violation 
or statutory obligations. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). The FMC [Fed. Maritime Comm.] is bound to 
accept tariffs in the foreign commerce that otherwise meet the regulations issued 
pursuant to the statute ... . If NEPA procedures conflict with this duty, the NEPA 
procedures might have to yield. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission 
476 F.2d 142 (1973). A preliminary injunction should not be issued in the face of a 
substantial question raised regarding the applicability of NEPA to the FM C's actions 
in this case. 
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for extending the NEPA to foreign assistance programs requiring 
activities within another sovereign's jurisdiction, the defendant 
agency should suggest practical considerations to the court for non-
application of the NEPA. 
As noted above, violation of an agency's mandate or significant 
interference with the implementation of the agency's purpose will 
be weighed heavily against strict NEPA application. Thus, the 
Export-Import Bank has in the past directed the court's attention 
to its enabling legislation. 141 In its brief for a motion for summary 
judgment in the Sierra Club v. AEC case, the Eximbank analyzed 
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 and concluded that the func-
tion and purpose of the bank was to provide financing and other 
assistance so that United States' exports would be able to compete 
in world markets. In addition, the bank noted that the 1971 amend-
ment was adopted to strengthen the bank's slipping competitive 
position by giving the bank more flexibility .142 
Application of the NEPA would impair the bank's ability to 
compete and thus seriously interfere with its purpose. Two major 
factors which produce this disadvantage is the time and the money 
141. In its brief in support of a motion for summary judgment Eximbank outlined several 
plausible arguments for violation or interference with purpose. Sierra Club v. United States 
Atomic Energy Commission, Civil No. 1867-73 (D.D.C. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Eximbank 
Brief]. 
142. Id. at 41-42. 
A review of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, demonstrates that 
the very nature of the Bank and the activities it performs are fundamentally incom-
patible with the application of NEPA to Bank activities . The language of that Act 
makes very clear that the sole function of the Bank is to assist United States exports 
in world markets by providing export financing that is competitive with export fi-
nancing provided by other exporting nations. Thus, the purpose of the Bank is to 
"foster expansion of exports of goods and related services, thereby contributing to the 
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the 
increased development of the productive resources of the United States." 
In 1971, Congress amended the Export-Import Bank Act to strengthen the Bank 
and make U.S. exports more competitive in world markets. As the Senate Report on 
the bill which became the 1971 amendment noted: 
The United States has, over the past decade, experienced a persistent 
imbalance in its international payments accounts. More recently, this imbal-
ance has been aggravated by the failure of U.S. exports to keep pace with 
greatly increasing imports. At the same time, the growth of U.S. exports 
failed also to keep pace with the growth of world trade. 
The primary feature in the amendment was a provision to withdraw Bank re-
ceipts and disbursements from the unified Federal budget. This was important so 
that "regardless of fluctuations in Government monetary and fiscal policies on the 
money markets at home and abroad" the Bank would still have flexibility "to meet 
the needs of the U.S. Export community . " 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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it takes to prepare an impact statement. 
The Eximbank has urged that compliance with 102(2)(C) pro-
cedures would seriously frustrate the quick decisionmaking neces-
sary for international negotiations.1 43 An impact statement and pre-
ceding assessment, depending on the project, can take a long time 
to prepare if done conscientiously. This delay can interfere greatly 
with the start and completion of any project. In a world which relies 
increasingly on computers in order to expedite decisions such "red 
tape" can be a serious handicap in competing with other govern-
ments for foreign markets. 
Cost is another factor which must be taken into account. It has 
been estimated that one environmental impact statement has cost 
$7 million to prepare. 144 Although the preparation of many impact 
statements would not approach this figure, it is likely that the hiring 
and sending of experts to a foreign country would be of great expense 
to both the applicant nation or corporation and the agency. This is 
not to mention the cost in terms of travel time. Whatever the final 
appro-ximation for each project, this figure must be added to the 
costs of the hundreds of other projects 145 which the agency engages 
in each month. The final figure could be astronomical and could 
well interfere with the budget of the agency. 
The burden of the cost must be allocated as well. Either it is 
distributed to the applicant nation directly by requiring it to pro-
duce its own impact statement which will meet 102(2)(C) standards 
(the agency could also provide the statement and bill directly), or 
else the cost is deflected by charging higher interest rates. Whatever 
option chosen, short of congressional budget allocation or subsidy, 
the burden will be shifted to the applicant. This will of course be 
sorely resented by all nations, rich and poor, and regarded as a 
special hardship by poor nations who would be compelled to spend 
money to get money. Certainly, applicants who can pick and choose 
between nations and markets for purchases and financing will hesi-
tate before incurring this added expense, red tape, and delay. 
The Eximbank has also indicated that 102(2)(C) disclosure re-
quirements "would frustrate foreign government demands for con-
fidence of negotiations." 146 True, secrets or materials necessitating 
143. Id. at 43. 
144. Joint Hearings before the Comm . on Public Works and the Comm . on the Interior 
and Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong. , 2d Sess. 557 (1972). 
145. Eximbank Brief, supra note 141, at 17. " Inasmuch as the Bank is involved in 
hundreds of 'significant' export financing transactions . . . . " Id . 
146. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 373. 
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such confidence could be deleted. However, this would render the 
effectiveness of 102(2)(C) minimal at best and make the preparation 
of an impact statement a futile exercise. 
Perhaps the most devastating argument to be noted is the un-
certainty which judicial review of NEPA procedure produces when-
ever Eximbank has committed itself on a project. This factor would 
not be lost on the potential applicant. With a federal court lurking 
in the background ready to test whether an impact statement is 
necessary and then whether it is adequate, the certainty necessary 
for most business deals would be destroyed. No applicant nation 
would wish to tie up its possibilities for financing by contracting 
with a nation which is never certain until the final court decision is 
handed down that it will be able to supply the money to start or 
complete a project. Nor does a court's inquiry stop once an 
"adequate" impact statement is filed. If an environmental group is 
so inclined, it can bring a suit to enjoin further action on a project 
already approved by an agency, stipulating that the agency's go 
ahead decision was arbitrary and did not properly take into account 
the environmental factors and alternatives brought out by the filed 
impact statement. "Most circuits, following the lead of Calvert 
Cliffs' . .. have required a showing of a good faith effort on the part 
of the agency to weigh environmental and developmental values in 
striking a final balance between the activity and its alternatives. " 147 
With a foreign policy which in large part has rested on mone-
tary incentives, Eximbank has been "a powerful tool in the hands 
of those who formulate this nation's overall foreign policy."148 Con-
gress has recognized that "the Bank is, in effect, an arm of this 
nation's foreign policy apparatus." 1411 Thus, the Bank in its decision-
making process has to have considered: "this nation's foreign policy 
objective of supporting free and democratic governments through-
out the world; and (c) enhance U.S. prestige and influence in neu-
tral states so that these states can resist the political influence of 
Communist countries. " 150 
Unfortunately, the difficulties delineated above could greatly 
undermine our foreign policy objectives. Applicant countries would 
certainly hesitate before accepting our foreign assistance. Similarly, 
applicants would consider Russia and other countries' willingness to 
147. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 470. 
148. Eximbank Brief, .<iupra note 141, at 20. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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finance without such cost and delay. Furthermore, our foreign pol-
icy would be damaged and our image tarnished because the coun-
tries would regard extraterritorial application of NEPA as 
"environmental imperialism." 151 Although it can be considered as a 
restriction on our own agency, putting few burdens on the applicant 
nations, many nations might view it as an imposition of our environ-
mental standards and resent it. 152 And, in part, the policy behind 
extension of NEPA to foreign jurisdiction is based on a belief that 
"it is highly improbable that host countries will ever consider envi-
ronmental factors to the same extent as this country." 153 This senti-
ment is reminiscent of the "white man's burden" expressed by this 
country and others in its imperialistic stage. It is a belief not neces-
sarily founded on truth. Furthermore, it is questionable whether 
this country has the right to determine another country's environ-
mental policy unless an impact is shown upon the U.S. 
The less developed countries argue that it is inequitable to 
require "the less developed countries to divert scarce resources to 
environmental quality in order to rectify the past environmental 
depredations of the developed nation," 154 and that the financial bur-
den should rest on the developed nation if it wishes to achieve a 
'certain standard of environmental quality. 
Application of the NEPA 102(2)(C) to foreign assistance agen-
cies essentially performing foreign policy functions raises serious 
questions of unconstitutional infringement by Congress upon the 
foreign policy power of the executive branch. "The extent of con-
gressional power in the field of foreign policy remains an open ques-
tion. The views range from exclusive executive power to determine 
foreign policy to recognition of concurrent power in Congress." 155 It 
has been argued by one commentator that Congress, having recog-
nized the possible "legislative usurpation of functions reserved to 
the executive," 158 inserted a saving feature which dissipates possible 
constitutional infirmities. That saving feature is the phrase "where 
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States. " 157 Perhaps 
the use of this phrase does dissipate constitutional infirmities, but 
151. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 378. 
152. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 468. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 353 (footnotes omitted). See generally Berger, The 
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
156. Strausberg, supra note 3, at 59. 
157. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E)). 
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this expression is found in 102(2)(E) and not in 102(2)(C) proce-
dures. It is significant that Congress felt it necessary to put in such 
a saving feature in an international cooperation provision. It would 
be logical to conclude that in the 102(2)(C) more stringent action-
forcing directive, Congress would have inserted a similar feature, or 
one of even more flexibility, if it had intended 102(2)(C) to apply 
to foreign policy agencies. 
The insertion of this "saving feature" underscores the possibil-
ity that practically speaking a court would not require a foreign 
assistance agency to file an impact statement. The agency could 
make a showing of conflict with foreign policy and the court would 
exempt it. "[A] court might well conclude that requiring the prep-
aration of an impact statement for extraterritorial activities would 
be relatively pointless if the nature of those activities necessitated 
that only a minimal standard of adequacy be applied." 1511 
Finally, it can be argued that for prudential reasons the court 
should not review the extraterritorial activities of federal agencies. 
To apply the NEPA 102(2)(C) requirement to these activities would 
require the court to review these activities as well, if there is to be 
any enforcement of these provisions. "Traditionally, the federal ju-
diciary has been reluctant to intervene in the conduct of foreign 
affairs." 1511 An analogy might be made to the act of state doctrine: 
A court might therefore rationally conclude that the federal 
activity under the control of the United States would not be an 
appropriate occasion to assess the environmental impact of an assis-
tance project, since so much would depend on measures taken by a 
sovereign independent of United States control. 160 
V. CONCLUSION 
Environmental planning is a desirable goal. But the question 
is whether the impact procedure is the best way of accomplishing 
this objective "when two or more sovereigns share the responsbility 
for a project. " 161 
This Note has focused on the statute itself to determine 
whether the statutory language and legislative history indicate a 
congressional intent to give the impact statement directive an extra-
territorial scope. 
158. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 471. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 472. 
161. Id. at 473. 
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Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, it must 
be concluded that there is no language in the statute or legislative 
history which would satisfy this well-established canon of con-
struction. To the contrary, it is highly probable that 102(2)(E), the 
international cooperation provision, was intended as an exclusive 
statement of the international aspects of the otherwise domesti-
cally oriented National Environmental Policy Act. 
It is evident, as well, that case law to date does not directly 
support the assertion that 102(2)(C) has an extraterritorial scope. 
Nor does it, or the language and legislative history of the statute, 
prove that the two provisions, 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(E), must be 
construed together. Instead, the case law points to the possibility 
that courts are willing to entertain countervailing considerations. 
The numerous policy arguments present the court with a vari-
ety of rationales as to why it would be impracticable, and unconsti-
tutional to apply the NEPA to foreign assistance programs. Thus, 
a court, if it should decide to apply the NEPA, must carefully con-
sider the possible ramifications of its holding in each case. 
However, if the plaintiff should be able to demonstrate sub-
stantial and significant domestic conduct or direct impact on the 
environment of the United States, the court might be warranted in 
dropping the presumption against extraterritoriality. This, coupled 
with a finding, if ascertainable, of some congressional intent to 
apply NEPA 102(2)(C) extraterritorially, could provide the basis for 
a theoretical extraterritorial application of the NEPA. At that stage, 
the court would be faced with the practical problems of applying the 
102(2)(C) provisions. Here, the court should allow a showing by the 
foreign assistance agency of reasons why the NEPA should yield. 
Jeremy Calton 
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